A week ago Prof. Tutzauer presented some of his work on the networked prisoners’ dilemma for my Communication Theory seminar. It was very interesting, both to the students and to me. Inevitably someone asked him about the utility of such simulations, and Frank gave his standard reply: he doesn’t care. But, as if to prove him wrong (or at least to appeal to a larger audience :), a blurb on a recent article, “Dynamic instabilities induced by asymmetric influence: Prisoners’ dilemma game in small-world networks”–which I have not yet read–in Physical Review E seems to imply that combining small-world models with the prisoners’ dilemma provides some insight into questions of authority in a social system.
The head of the chain gang
A week ago Prof. Tutzauer presented some of his work on the networked prisoners’ dilemma for my Communication Theory seminar. It was very interesting, both to the students and to me. Inevitably someone asked him about the utility of such simulations, and Frank gave his standard reply: he doesn’t care. But, as if to prove him wrong (or at least to appeal to a larger audience :), a blurb on a recent article, “Dynamic instabilities induced by asymmetric influence: Prisoners’ dilemma game in small-world networks”–which I have not yet read–in Physical Review E seems to imply that combining small-world models with the prisoners’ dilemma provides some insight into questions of authority in a social system.
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